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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Brisson v. Santoriello and Rule 9(): A Step Backward in the
Pursuit to Prevent Frivolous Medical Malpractice Actions in
North Carolina
North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)' allows a
plaintiff to take a voluntary dismissal without prejudice at any time
before "resting" his case.2 If the original action was commenced
within the statute of limitations, the plaintiff may re-file an action
based on the same claim within one year of the voluntary dismissal.
1. N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). Throughout this Recent Development, any mention of a
"Rule" refers to the specific North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise
indicated. The relevant portion of Rule 41(a)(1), governing voluntary dismissals, reads as
follows:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(c) and of any statute of this State, an action
or any claim therein may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i)
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the plaintiff rests his case, or; (ii)
by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the
dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in
any court of this or any other state or of the United States, an action based on or
including the same claim. If an action commenced within the time prescribed
therefor, or any claim therein, is dismissed without prejudice under this
subsection, a new action based on the same claim may be commenced within one
year after such dismissal unless a stipulation filed under (ii) of this subsection
shall specify a shorter time.
2. Id.; see also Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Walton, 256 N.C. 345, 347, 123 S.E.2d
780, 782 (1962) (noting that a plaintiff's right to take a voluntary dismissal under the
former rule is not subject to judicial review). Under Rule 41(a)(1), a plaintiff is deemed to
have "rested his case" when he is given an opportunity at a summary judgment hearing to
introduce evidence and argue his position, and thereafter the matter is submitted to the
court for determination. Alston v. Duke Univ., 133 N.C. App. 57, 61, 514 S.E.2d 298, 301
(1999) (quoting Wesley v. Bland, 92 N.C. App. 513, 515, 374 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1988)).
However, if the plaintiff does not make opposing arguments at the hearing, he may still
take a voluntary dismissal as a matter of right before he rests his case. Id.; Wesley, 92 N.C.
App. at 514-15, 374 S.E.2d at 476 (" 'Where a party appears at a summary judgment
hearing and produces evidence or is given an opportunity to produce evidence and fails to
do so, and the question is submitted to the court for decision, he has "rested his case"
within the meaning of Rule 41(a)(1)(i).'" (quoting Maurice v. Hatterasman Motel Corp.,
38 N.C. App. 588,591-92,248 S.E.2d 430,432-33 (1978))).
3. Under Rule 41(a)(1), a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss and re-file a claim within
the one-year "savings" provision only once as a matter of right. N.C. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1);
Parrish v. Uzzell, 41 N.C. 479, 483-84, 255 S.E.2d 219,221 (1979); City of Raleigh v. Coll.
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For the past decade, North Carolina courts have operated under the
assumption that the one-year tolling provision was subject to the
original complaint conforming "in all respects to the rules of
pleading."4  In Brisson v. SantorielloI however, the North Carolina
Supreme Court changed this rule. This Recent Development
attempts to clarify where North Carolina law stands concerning
voluntary dismissals in medical malpractice actions as a result of
Brisson.
Brisson involved a medical malpractice action for alleged
negligence in performing an abdominal hysterectomy. 6 Rule 90) of
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure requires a medical
malpractice plaintiff to attach an expert certification to the
complaint.7 The Brisson plaintiffs failed to attach the Rule 9(j)
certification, and the defendants moved to dismiss the case pursuant
to Rules 90) and 12(b)(6). The plaintiffs then filed a motion to
amend the complaint to include the proper certification, or in the
alternative, to dismiss the claims without prejudice pursuant to Rule
41(a)(1).9 The trial judge denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend, but
reserved ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss.10 Consequently,
Campus Apts., Inc., 94 N.C. App. 280, 282, 380 S.E.2d 163, 164-65 (1989), affd, 326 N.C.
360,388 S.E.2d 768 (1990). This is commonly referred to as the "second dismissal" rule. 2
G. GRAY WILSON, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 41-4, at 42 (2d ed. 1995).
4. Estrada v. Burnham, 316 N.C. 318,323,341 S.E.2d 538,542 (1986) ("[I]n order for
a timely filed complaint to toll the statute of limitations and provide the basis for a one-
year 'extension' by way of a Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal without prejudice, the
complaint must conform in all respects to the rules of pleading ... ."); see also Sweet v.
Boggs, 134 N.C. App. 173, 176, 516 S.E.2d 888, 890 (1999) (holding that a defective
complaint cannot toll the statute of limitations under Rule 41(a)(1)); Robinson v.
Entwistle, 132 N.C. App. 519, 522-23, 512 S.E.2d 438, 441 (holding that Rule 41(a)(1) is
only available where the complaint complies with the rules of pleading prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations), discretionary review denied, 350 N.C. 595, 537
S.E.2d 482 (1999).
5. 351 N.C. 589,528 S.E.2d 568 (2000).
6. 351 N.C. at 590-91, 528 S.E.2d at 569. Pamela Brisson's husband, Dallas Brisson,
was also a plaintiff in this action alleging loss of consortium. Id.
7. N.C. R. CIv. P. 90). Rule 90) provides that a medical malpractice claim must
assert in the pleadings that a person reasonably expected to qualify as an expert, who is
willing to testify that the claim is valid, has reviewed the case. Id. The rule provides for a
120-day extension of the relevant statute of limitations to comply with expert certification
requirement, upon a determination that "good cause" exists for granting the extension.
Id. There is substantial conflict among trial lawyers over whether Rule 9(j) is a prudent
law, and questions have also been raised as to its constitutionality; these issues, however,
are beyond the scope of this Recent Development. See Mark R. Melrose, Closing the
Courthouse Doors: Rule 9() and Rule 702, TRIAL BRIEFS, Sept. 2000, at 11.
8. Brisson, 351 N.C. at 591,528 S.E.2d at 569.
9. Id. at 592, 528 S.E.2d at 569-70.
10. Id. at 592, 528 S.E.2d at 570.
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the plaintiffs took a voluntary dismissal without prejudice; but then
subsequently re-filed the action after the original statute of
limitations had expired." The North Carolina Supreme Court
addressed whether the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal effectively
extended the statute of limitations even though the original complaint
lacked a Rule 9(j) certification.
The Brisson court construed Rules 41 and 9(j) together and held
that the Rule 9(j) defect did not bar the plaintiffs from utilizing the
one-year "savings" provision of Rule 41(a)(1)." The court refused to
apply its earlier holding established in Estrada v. Burnham,4 when
the court held that in order to take advantage of the Rule 41(a)(1)
"savings" provision, the original complaint "must conform in all
respects to the rules of pleading."'" The North Carolina Court of
Appeals cited Estrada as binding authority in two recent cases,
including one medical malpractice action, addressing whether
pleading defects preclude a plaintiff's use of the Rule 41(a)(1) one-
year extension.'6 This precedent to the contrary and the strong
dissent in Brisson17 suggest that the Brisson majority's reasoning is
flawed.
To understand fully the implications of Brisson, some discussion
of the voluntary dismissal rule is in order. The voluntary dismissal
without prejudice is one of the most powerful litigation tools available
to a plaintiff's attorney. 9 It allows plaintiff's counsel to take a
11. Id. The statute of limitations for filing a medical malpractice action in North
Carolina is three years. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (1999).
12. Brisson, 351 N.C. at 593,528 S.E.2d at 570.
13. Ik at 597,528 S.E.2d at 573.
14. 316 N.C. 318, 323, 341 S.E.2d 538, 542 (1986); see infra notes 68-72 and
accompanying text (discussing Estrada).
15. Id. at 323,341 S.E.2d at 542.
16. See, e.g., Sweet v. Boggs, 134 N.C. App. 173, 176, 516 S.E.2d 888, 890 (1999)
(holding that Rule 41(a)(1) could not revive the action after the statute of limitations had
expired because the original complaint was defective); Robinson v. Entwinstle, 132 N.C.
App. 519, 522-23, 512 S.E.2d 438, 441 (affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's action
because both the original and amended complaints failed to comply with Rule 9(j) and
"Rule 41(a)(1) is only available in an action where the complaint complied with the rules
which govern its form and content prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations"),
discretionary review denied, 350 N.C. 595,537 S.E.2d 482 (1999).
17. Brisson, 351 N.C. at 598-601,528 S.E.2d at 573-75 (Wainwright, J., dissenting).
18. See infra notes 96--00 and accompanying text.
19. See 2 WILSON, supra note 3, § 41-1, at 32 (stating that the voluntary dismissal "has
salvaged more lawsuits than any other procedural device"). Rule 41(a)(1) has commonly
been used by plaintiffs for one-time judge or jury shopping and provides a safety net for
unprepared lawyers. Id. at 33; see also 8 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACrICE § 41.11 (3d ed. 2000) (listing over twenty reasons why a plaintiff may take a
voluntary dismissal).
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voluntary dismissal, regardless of opposition from the defense or the
court, at any time before he "rests his case"'2 by simply giving oral
notice of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice in open court.21 This
escape mechanism allows a plaintiff to cure not only defects which
were not apparent until trial, but also to have a test run at presenting
his case. 2 The voluntary dismissal without prejudice has been utilized
more than any other procedural device to save a failing lawsuit and
allow a plaintiff to start over with a clean slate.23
Considering the power the voluntary dismissal rule places in the
hands of plaintiffs' attorneys, its frequent abuse is not surprising.
These abusive tactics include the following: (1) pursuing one-time
jury and judge shopping;24 (2) avoiding dismissal for violation of
discovery and other court orders;z2 and (3) avoiding summary
judgment, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, and judgment on the pleadings.26
20. N.C. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1). For a discussion of when a plaintiff is deemed to have
"rested his case," see supra note 2.
21. See Danielson v. Cummings, 300 N.C. 175, 179,265 S.E.2d 161, 163 (1980); Gilliam
v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 125 N.C. App. 416,418,481 S.E.2d 334,336 (1997).
22. See W. BRIAN HOWELL, HOWELL'S SHUFORD, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 41-2, at 477 (5th ed. 1998) ("Rule 41(a)(1) provides ... a
second chance for the plaintiff who, during the course of the presentation of his evidence,
perceives that such evidence may be insufficient. As long as the plaintiff does so before
resting his case, the plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss... and attempt to 'mend his licks.' ");
2 WILSON, supra note 3, § 41-1, at 33 (indicating that Rule 41(a)(1) is often used to cure
defects that did not become apparent until trial).
23. Brisson, 351 N.C. at 597, 528 S.E.2d at 572-73 (citing 2 WILSON, supra note 3, at
32).
24. See, e.g., Thompson v. Newman, 331 N.C. 709,710, 417 S.E.2d 224,224-25 (1992)
(taking a voluntary dismissal after the judge quashed the plaintiff's subpoena for certain
witnesses and denied the plaintiff's motion to continue).
25. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Cheek, 308 N.C. 670,672,303 S.E.2d 792,794 (1983) (avoiding
dismissal because of failure to comply with discovery order).
26. See, e.g., Alston v. Duke Univ., 133 N.C. App. 57, 60-61, 514 S.E.2d 298, 300
(1999) (avoiding summary judgment based on failure to comply with Rule 9(j)); Wesley v.
Bland, 92 N.C. App. 513, 513, 374 S.E.2d 475, 476 (1988) (avoiding summary judgment);
see also 2 WILSON, supra note 3, § 41-1, at 33, § 41-2, at 36 (discussing the various ways
plaintiffs have abused the voluntary dismissal rule).
North Carolina is not the only state to experience abuses of the voluntary
dismissal rule. Illinois also addressed this issue in Gibellina v. Handley, 535 N.E.2d 858
(Ill. 1989). The Illinois Supreme Court, after noting the increasing number of voluntary
dismissals to avoid adverse rulings and disposititve motions, held that a "trial court may
hear and decide a motion which has been filed prior to a [voluntary dismissal] motion
when that motion, if favorably ruled on by the court, could result in a final disposition of
the case." Gibellina, 535 N.E.2d at 865-69. In 1993, the Illinois legislature codified the
Gibellina rule. See Act of July 28, 1993, 1993 Ill. Laws 157 (codified at 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/2-1009 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000)).
On the other hand, Georgia honors a plaintiff's right to voluntarily dismiss
regardless of bad faith intentions, despite the inconvenience or irritation it may cause the
defendant. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-41 (2000). Under Georgia law, a plaintiff can
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Rule 41(a)(1) has also been used in an attempt to extend the statute
of limitations in order to file a valid complaint. 27 In Estrada v.
Burnham,' however, the North Carolina Supreme Court eliminated
this latter abuse by limiting the availability of the one-year extension
under Rule 41(a)(1) to complaints that "conform in all respects to the
rules of pleading. '2 9 The Estrada rule was particularly significant in
medical malpractice actions if the complaint had a Rule 9(j) defect.30
For example, in Robinson v. Entwinstle,31 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiff's complaint did not conform to the
rules of pleading because it failed to comply with Rule 9(j) before the
statute of limitations expired.32 But, as a result of Brisson, medical
malpractice plaintiffs may now relax for an additional year.
In Brisson, the supreme court held that the plaintiffs' voluntary
dismissal effectively extended the statute of limitations, allowing them
to recommence the action within one year, even though the complaint
lacked a Rule 9(j) certification.' The court disregarded the court of
appeals's reasoning, and relied instead on its own statutory
construction of Rules 41 and 9(j). 35 The court noted that " 'statutes
voluntarily dismiss without prejudice any time before resting his case during the actual
trial, notwithstanding any pretrial proceeding where the court considers evidence. See
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Van Diviere, 384 S.E.2d 272,273 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Muhanna v.
O'Kelley, 363 S.E.2d 626,627 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
27. Estrada v. Burnham, 316 N.C. 318,320-21,341 S.E.2d 538,540-41 (1986).
28. 316 N.C. 318,341 S.E.2d 538 (1986).
29. Id at 323, 341 S.E.2d at 542.
30. See Robinson v. Entwinstle, 132 N.C. App. 519, 523, 512 S.E.2d 438, 441 (holding
that a one-year extension was unavailable when the plaintiff's original complaint did not
include a Rule 9(j) certification and subsequent amendment named expert that was not
qualified), discretionary review denied, 350 N.C. 595,537 S.E.2d 482 (1999).
31. 132 N.C. App. 519,512 S.E.2d 438 (1999).
32. Id at 523, 512 S.E.2d at 441.
33. As discussed infra notes 82-101 and accompanying text, a plaintiff can utilize the
one-year extension of Rule 41(a)(1) as a means of curing a Rule 9(j) defect and extending
the statute of limitations. See Brisson, 351 N.C. at 597, 528 S.E.2d at 573.
34. Id. at 593,528 S.E.2d at 570.
35. Id. at 594, 528 S.E.2d at 571. The North Carolina Court of Appeals and the North
Carolina Supreme Court differ entirely in their analysis of this case. Compare Brisson, 351
N.C. at 594-98, 528 S.E.2d at 571-73 (reflecting the supreme court's emphasis on statutory
construction), with Brisson v. Santoriello, 134 N.C. App. 65, 67-73, 516 S.E.2d 911, 913-16
(1999) (reflecting the court of appeals's focus on the plaintiffs motion to amend). The
court of appeals focused on the trial judge's decision denying the plaintiffs' motion to
amend. Brisson, 134 N.C. App. at 68-69, 516 S.E.2d at 914. The court pointed out that
the plaintiffs erroneously believed that they had to get leave of court to amend the
complaint; thus, the judge's denial of the amendment was error. Id The court of appeals
held that Estrada was irrelevant to its decision because the Brisson plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint, which related back under Rule 15(c) of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure; therefore, the complaint "complied with the rules, which govern its form
and content prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations." Id. at 72, 516 S.E.2d at
2001]
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dealing with the same subject matter must be construed in pari
materia and harmonized, if possible, to give effect to each.' ,36 After
completing statutory analysis, the court concluded that Rules 90) and
41 could be harmonized to give effect to each;37 but in doing so it
failed to recognize the practical effects of its decision.
The court acknowledged the Rule 9(j) requirement-that an
expert witness certification must be attached to a complaint in a
medical malpractice action-but concluded that the legislature must
have intended Rule 41(a)(1) to be available to toll the statute of
limitations because Rule 9(j) does not expressly preclude a plaintiff's
use of a Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal 8 The court supported its
conclusion by noting that a defendant can move for an involuntary
916. Conversely, the supreme court held that the plaintiffs' motion to amend was "neither
dispositive nor relevant to the outcome of this case." Brisson, 351 N.C. at 593, 528 S.E.2d
at 570. The higher court relied solely on the relationship between Rules 9(j) and 41,
noting that whether the proposed amended complaint related back "has no bearing on this
case once plaintiffs took their voluntary dismissal." Id.
What is striking about these markedly different approaches is that the court of
appeals presumably would have upheld the trial court's dismissal had the amended
complaint not related back (as a result of Rule 15(c) being unavailable to cure a Rule 90)
defect). See Brisson, 134 N.C. App. at 65, 516 S.E.2d at 916 ("Estrada ... can be
distinguished ... by the fact that, here, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that related
back to the filing of the original complaint .... Thus, insofar as plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint ... we hold that plaintiffs were entitled to the benefit of the Rule 41(a)(1)
extension." (emphasis added)). The issue of whether Rule 15(c)-governing the relation
back of amendments to comply with the statute of limitations-applies to proposed
amendments to cure a Rule 90) defect has never been addressed by the North Carolina
Supreme Court. See Keith v. N. Hosp. Dist., 348 N.C. 693, 511 S.E.2d 646 (1998)
(declining to review whether Rule 15(c) is available to cure a rule 90) defect).
In Keith v. Northern Hospital District, the court of appeals reviewed a case in
which a medical malpractice plaintiff failed to include the Rule 90) certification in her
complaint; the trial judge denied her motion to amend the complaint to relate back to the
date of the original filing. 129 N.C. App. 402,403-04,499 S.E.2d 200,201-02 (1998). The
three judges agreed that the dismissal was proper, however, they did not agree on whether
the Rule 15(c) relation back provision could be used to cure a Rule 90) defect. See id. at
406-08, 499 S.E.2d at 203-04. The North Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Keith and has yet to address whether Rule 15(c) is available to cure a Rule 9(j) defect.
Keith, 348 N.C. 693,511 S.E.2d 646 (1998). Nevertheless, Brisson renders the issue largely
insignificant because a plaintiff can now use Rule 41(a)(1) to cure a defective complaint.
See Brisson, 351 N.C. at 597, 528 S.E.2d at 573. For an insightful analysis of Keith and
Rule 90), see Daniel Burt Arrington, Note, Keith v. Northern Hospital District of Surry
County and Rule 9(j): Preventing Frivolous Medical Malpractice Claims at the Expense of
North Carolina's Equitable Powers, 77 N.C. L. REV. 2303,2305-25 (1999).
36. Brisson, 351 N.C. at 595,528 S.E.2d at 571 (quoting Bd. of Adjustment v. Town of
Swansboro, 334 N.C. 421,427,432 S.E.2d 310,313 (1993)).
37. Id., 528 S.E.2d at 571-72.
38. Id., 528 S.E.2d at 571 ("Had the legislature intended to prohibit plaintiffs in
medical malpractice actions from taking voluntary dismissals where their complaint did
not include a Rule 90) certification, then it could have made such intention explicit.").
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dismissal under Rule 41(b) if a plaintiff fails to comply with the rules
or any order of the court.3 9 Therefore, the court stated that the
legislature intended Rule 41(b) to dispose of defective complaints.4
A closer look at Rules 90) and 41, however, suggests that the
legislature intended otherwise.4'
The express language of Rule 9(j) clearly states that a complaint
alleging medical malpractice "shall be dismissed" unless the pleading
contains the proper expert witness certification.4 2  Moreover,
subsection (j) is the only subsection of Rule 9 expressly mandating
dismissal for failing to comply with the special pleading
requirement.4 3 This inclusion suggests that the legislature intended to
treat violations of subsection (j) with less tolerance than other
provisions of Rule 9.
The text of subsection (j) also reveals the error in the court's
reasoning. As the dissent properly asserted,44 Rule 9(j) provides a
plaintiff with the opportunity, prior to the expiration of the statute of
limitations, to obtain a 120-day extension of the statute of limitations
in order to comply with the certification requirement.45 More
importantly, the plaintiff must show that "good cause" exists before
the extension will be granted.46 The majority's conclusion allows a
plaintiff to avoid this "good cause" showing by taking a voluntary
dismissal and re-filing the claim within one year. However, the
legislature probably did not intend a plaintiff who cannot obtain a
120-day extension, for lack of good cause, to be able to take a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice and then utilize the one-year
extension pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1). Such a result defies the trial
judge who determined that an extension was not warranted in the
first place. Furthermore, the 120-day extension would be wholly
39. L at 595, 528 S.E.2d at 571-72; see also N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (stating that a
defendant may move for an involuntary dismissal of a claim if the plaintiff fails to comply
with the rules or any order of the court).
40. Brisson, 351 N.C. at 595,528 S.E.2d at 572.
41. See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
42. N.C. R. CIv. P. 9(j).
43. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 9. The dissent aptly pointed out the "shall be dismissed"
clause; Justice Wainwright used this language to refute the majority's contention that the
legislature would have expressly addressed Rule 41(a)(1) if it had intended the one-year
savings provision to be unavailable. Brisson, 351 N.C. at 599-600, 528 S.E.2d at 574
(Wainwright, J., dissenting). Under his view, the legislature did not address Rule 41(a)(1)
because it never imagined Rule 41(a)(1) as an option since the complaint was to be
mandatorily dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 9(). Id (Wainwright, J.,
dissenting).
44. Id. at 599,528 S.E.2d at 574 (Wainwright, J., dissenting).
45. N.C. R. CIV. P. 9(j).
46. Id
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unnecessary if the legislature intended to make the Rule 41(a)(1)
"savings" provision available to cure a Rule 9(j) defect.47 Thus,
Brisson's result appears inconsistent with the legislature's intent in
creating Rule 9(j), and more specifically, the requirement of a "good
cause" showing to obtain the 120-day extension.48
The court's reliance on Rule 41(b) to assist defendants in
disposing of defective complaints was also misplaced. By pointing out
the availability of Rule 41(b), the court implied that defendants will
not be prejudiced because the legislature provided a backup for
defendants to move for an involuntary dismissal.49 Thus, the court
concluded that the legislature intended to subject a plaintiff's
47. For a similar reading of Rule 9(j) with respect to amending a complaint to comply
with the certification requirement, see Arrington, supra note 35, at 2317.
48. The history of Rule 9(j) is useful in discerning the legislature's intent. The official
comment to Rule 9 states: "This rule is designed to lay down some special rules for
pleading in typically recurring contexts which have traditionally caused trouble when no
codified directive existed." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-i, Rule 9 cmt. (1999). The title of the
legislation enacting subsection (j) is very explicit: "An Act to Prevent Frivolous Medical
Malpractice Actions by Requiring the Expert Witnesses in Medical Malpractice Actions
Have Appropriate Qualifications to Testify on the Standard of Care at Issue and to
Require Expert Witness Review as a Condition of Filing a Medical Malpractice Action."
Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 309, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 611 (codified at N.C. R. Civ. P. 9j)).
The act's title clearly indicates that the legislature intended to make expert review a
condition precedent for filing a medical malpractice action.
Furthermore, when the bill was in committee, there were concerns about the
difficulty in finding qualified experts under Rule of Evidence 702 before the statute of
limitations expired. See House Select Comm. on Tort Reform, Minutes, H.B. 730, 1995
Leg., 2d Sess. (N.C. 1995). Several changes were made to the bill, including the addition
of a ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations, which ultimately was increased to
120 days before adoption. Compare H.B. 730, 1995 Leg., 2nd Sess. (N.C. 1995) (3rd
version May 3, 1995), with Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 309, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 611
(codified at N.C. R. Civ. P. 90)). The provision allowing for a 120-day extension
evidences the legislature's awareness that this prerequisite review would burden plaintiffs
and the need to accommodate meritorious claims that might otherwise expire. The
legislature had to make the pleading requirements onerous in order to achieve its
objective-preventing frivolous medical malpractice actions. Justice Wainwright properly
considered these points in his dissent. See Brisson, 351 N.C. at 599, 528 S.E.2d at 574
(Wainwright, J., dissenting).
The majority relied heavily on the fact that the legislature could have specifically
addressed Rule 41 had it intended to preclude a Rule 41(a)(1) extension to cure a Rule
90) defect. Id at 595, 528 S.E.2d at 571. In 1999, however, the North Carolina General
Assembly considered, and rejected, a bill that would have made an involuntary dismissal
for failure to comply with Rule 9(j) "not an adjudication on the merits." S.B. 1012, 1999
Leg., 2d Sess. (N.C. 1999) (rejected). Although there is no way of knowing exactly why
the legislature rejected this provision, its rejection seems more consistent with the view
that the legislature did not intend Rule 41 to aid plaintiffs in curing a Rule 90) defect.
49. See Brisson, 351 N.C. at 595, 528 S.E.2d at 571-72 (stating that Rule 41(b) allows
defendants to move for an involuntary dismissal for failure to comply with the pleading
rules).
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complaint to a Rule 41(b) involuntary dismissal for failing to comply
with Rule 9(). 50 The practical effect of the court's conclusion creates
a significant, incidental result-any competent plaintiff's attorney will
take a voluntary dismissal as matter of right in the face of an
involuntary dismissal based on a Rule 90) defect.51 Certainly, a trial
judge has the discretion to order an involuntary dismissal "without"
prejudice,52 but plaintiff's attorneys will invariably take a guaranteed
one-year extension rather than chance the judge's discretion5 3 It is
arguably legal malpractice not to do so. Thus, Brisson effectively
destroys Rule 41(b) as a defensive remedy in medical malpractice
actions when there is a Rule 9(j) defect in the pleading.
Furthermore, the court's interpretation of Rules 41 and 90) is
inconsistent with well-established rules of statutory construction.
When two statutes deal with the same subject-one in "general and
comprehensive terms" and the other in a "more minute and definite
way"-the statutes should be construed together and harmonized to
give a consistent legislative policy to each.' However, to the extent
that there is any repugnancy between them, the more definite statute
should prevail over the general statute unless it appears that the
legislature intended otherwise 5 This rule of statutory construction is
"true a fortiori when the special act is later in point of time, although
50. See id.
51. Because a plaintiff can take a voluntary dismissal any time before resting her case,
the plaintiff can voluntarily dismiss and avoid an involuntary dismissal. N.C. R. CIv. P.
41(a)(1). This possibility has already been recognized in a case decided after Brisson. See
Allen v. Carolina Permanente Med., Group, No. COA99-1038, 2000 N.C. App. LEXIS
903, at *9, 533 S.E.2d 812, 816 (N.C. App. Aug. 1, 2000); see also infra notes 91-94 and
accompanying text (discussing Allen).
52. Whedon v. Whedon, 313 N.C. 200, 213, 328 S.E.2d 437, 445 (1985) ("The trial
court's authority to order an involuntary dismissal without prejudice is... exercised in the
broad discretion of the trial court and the ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of a showing of abuse of discretion.").
53. Under Rule 41(b), the judge has discretion to dismiss a claim without prejudice
and allow a plaintiff up to a year to re-file the claim, even if the original statute of
limitations has expired. Lumber Co. v. Barkley, 120 N.C. App. 271, 272-73, 461 S.E.2d
780, 782 (1995) ("Although the savings provision of Rule 41(b) is triggered differently
than the savings provision of Rule 41(a) in that Rule 41(b) requires the judge to
affirmatively grant extra time, the effect of each savings provision once triggered is the
same.").
54. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 631, 461 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1995) (citing Food
Stores v. Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 268 N.C. 624, 628-29, 151 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1966)
(quoting 82 CJ.S. Statutes § 369, at 839-43 (1953))); see also Bd. of Adjustment v. Town of
Swansboro, 334 N.C. 421,427,432 S.E.2d 310,313 (1993) (stating that statutes dealing with
the same subject should be construed in pari materia and harmonized, if possible).
55. McIntyre, 341 N.C. at 631, 461 S.E.2d at 747 (citing Food Stores, 268 N.C. at 628-
29,151 S.E.2d at 586).
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the rule is applicable without regard to the respective dates of
passage."56  The court misapplied these tenets of statutory
construction in Brisson.
Rule 9(j) is a specific -rule that addresses only medical
malpractice claims, whereas Rule 41 is a general rule addressing
dismissals in a variety of settings. Moreover, Rule 9(j) was enacted
over twenty-five years after Rule 41. 7 Further, there is no indication
that the legislature intended the more general act (Rule 41) to be
controlling. 8 The court's interpretation of these statutes is also
questionable for at least three additional reasons. First, the majority's
interpretation effaces 41(b) in practice.59 Second, it negates the
"good cause" provision of Rule 9(j).6 Finally, it extends the statute
of limitations beyond that which the legislature provided for in the
Rule 9(j) 120-day extension.6'
Because the court's construction creates inconsistency between
the two Rules, the better interpretation is that the legislature, aware
of the apparent conflicts, intended Rule 41(a) to be unavailable to
cure Rule 9(j) defects. This view is more consistent with the rules of
statutory construction stated above and is further supported by the
legislature's explicit mandate that a defective complaint under Rule
9(j) "shall be dismissed." 62
Notwithstanding its focus on statutory construction, the court
also addressed prior case law dealing with voluntary dismissals.63 The
defendants in Brisson, citing Estrada, argued that the one-year
extension was not available because the complaint did not "conform
in all respects to the rules of pleading."'  The court distinguished
Estrada on the grounds that the plaintiff in that case had filed the
56. Id
57. Compare N.C. R. CIv. P. 9(j) (enacted in 1995), with N.C. R. CIv. P. 41 (enacted
in 1967).
58. Cf Brisson, 351 N.C. at 595, 528 S.E.2d at 571 (noting the lack of express
legislative intent as to whether Rule 41(a)(1) was available to cure a Rule 90) defect).
59. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (explaining the practical effect of
Brisson on the availability of Rule 41(b)).
60. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing the plaintiff's ability to
evade the "good cause" showing).
61. The dissent in Brisson pointed out that the majority's conclusion will effectively
extend the medical malpractice statute of limitations to four years and 120 days. Brisson,
351 N.C. at 600, 528 S.E.2d at 574-75 (Wainwright, J. dissenting). For a more detailed
discussion of this aspect of the dissent, see infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
62. N.C. R. CIV. P. 90).
63. See Brisson, 351 N.C. at 595-97,528 S.E.2d at 572.




complaint in bad faith for the sole purpose of tolling the statute of
limitations.' The Brisson court also indicated that the language
relied on from Estrada was mere dicta and not controlling.66 It is
significant, however, that the language in Estrada was the supreme
court's conclusion after construing the Rules of Civil Procedure as a
whole.67 In Estrada, the court noted that the Rules of Civil Procedure
"'should be construed as a whole, giving no one rule disproportionate
emphasis over another applicable rule.' "I After construing Rules
41(a)(1) and 11(a) 69 together, the court stated: "[W]e hold.., that, in
order for a timely filed complaint to toll the statute of limitations and
provide the basis for a one-year 'extension' by way of a Rule 41(a)(1)
voluntary dismissal without prejudice, the complaint must conform in
all respects to the rules of pleading, including Rule 11(a)."70 Thus, it is
difficult to understand the Brisson court's characterization of this
statement as mere dicta given that it was the product of the same
methodology undertaken in Brisson. In Estrada, the court construed
the Rules of Civil Procedure in pari materia and concluded that the
Rule 41(a)(1) extension was only available if the complaint
"conform[ed] in all respects to the rules of pleading."'71 The Estrada
court's reference to Rule 11(a)72 only strengthens the court's
understanding that a complaint must conform to all other rules of
pleading as well.
The Brisson court also noted that the Estrada court did not cite
any authority for its conclusion.73 While this is true, the majority itself
failed to cite authority for its conclusion in Brisson. The probable
explanation for the omission of authority from both cases stems from
the fact that statutory construction depends, in part, on legislative
intent. Unfortunately, North Carolina does not currently have a
system for publishing a full legislative history, and thus legislative
intent is difficult to determine.74
65. d at 596,528 S.E.2d at 572.
66. Id
67. See Estrada, 316 N.C. at 323,341 S.E.2d at 542.
68. Id. (quoting WILLIAM A. SHUFORD, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PRACICE &
PROCEDURE § 1-3 (2d ed. 1981).
69. N.C. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 governs the signing of pleadings and requires that all
pleadings be filed in good faith and not for an improper purpose. Id.
70. Estrada, 316 N.C. at 323,341 S.E.2d at 542 (emphasis added).
71. Id
72. Id.
73. Brisson, 351 N.C. at 597,528 S.E.2d at 572.
74. See North Carolina ex rel. Edminsten v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc., 292 N.C. 311, 317,
233 S.E.2d 895, 899 (1977) ("Strictly speaking, North Carolina has no documented
legislative history."); G. Nicholas Herman, A Practical System for Legal Research, 21 N.C.
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In rejecting the Estrada rule, the court stated that a literal
interpretation of that rule "could essentially eviscerate the
legislature's intent in creating the long-standing benefit of a Rule
41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal one-year extension."'75 Accordingly, the
court held that Rule 41(a)(1) provides a plaintiff with a guaranteed
one-time opportunity to discontinue a lawsuit and start over. 6
Incidentally, application of the Estrada rule would still have made the
one-year extension available in all cases except where there was a
defect in the pleading (so Rule 41(a)(1) would be available to cure
evidentiary defects or other problems arising before the plaintiff rests
her case).
Brisson declared only two limitations to utilizing the one-year
extension: (1) "the dismissal [must] not be done in bad faith," and (2)
"[the dismissal must] be done prior to a trial court's ruling dismissing
plaintiff's claim or otherwise ruling against plaintiff at any time prior
to plaintiff resting his or her case at trial. '77 The second limitation is
interesting because there is no general requirement that a plaintiff
take a voluntary dismissal prior to any adverse ruling. Perhaps the
court was actually referring to dispositive rulings, but this would only
repeat its first statement-that a voluntary dismissal must be taken
before a trial court dismisses-and such duplication would seem
unnecessary. Another possible interpretation, and one that helps
reduce the potential for abuse of Rule 41(a)(1), is that the court
meant to make the one-year extension unavailable once a plaintiff
receives any adverse ruling. For example, suppose the trial judge
ruled to exclude certain evidence or denied plaintiff a continuance or
extension for any particular request. The second limitation would
CENT. L.J. 85, 89 n.9 (1995) ("There is no formal collection of legislative history in North
Carolina such as that found in federal law."); Louise Stafford, North Carolina Legislative
History, 38 N.C. ST. B. Q. 22 (1991) (compiling a helpful guide to researching legislative
history in North Carolina); Margaret Creasy Ciardella, Note, The 1985 General Assembly
Enacts Broad Based Tax Relief for North Carolina Citizens, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1508, 1508 n.5
(1985) ("Because North Carolina does not have any recorded legislative history the
analysis is limited to a reading of the prior statute and the effect the amendments have on
these statutes. Some insight into the legislative purpose of the amendments can be
garnered, however, by noting the titles to the various acts."). A legislative record of the
floor debates would provide lawyers and courts with information as to what the General
Assembly considered and rejected when drafting a law. This record would aid the courts
in determining legislative intent when they are called upon to interpret statutes such as the
ones involved in Brisson. Perhaps North Carolina will adopt such a policy in the future,
but for now, the courts continue to rely on assumptions about what the legislature did or
did not consider when drafting laws.
75. Brisson, 351 N.C. at 597,528 S.E.2d at 572.




keep a plaintiff from dismissing the case and starting over with a more
lenient judge. The limitation would not only curb abuse of Rule
41(a)(1), but it would also make for better use of the courts' time and
resourcesY8 The court's intention in creating this limitation is unclear,
but it will surely be the subject of debate for future courts to
reconcile.
The majority concluded its opinion by discussing the "practical
ramifications" of its decision.79 In its view, the majority merely
harmonized the provisions of Rules 9(j) and 41(a).80  Medical
malpractice plaintiffs will not be thrown out of court merely because
their attorney failed to attach a Rule 9(j) certification, and frivolous
claims ultimately will be dismissed for failure to obtain an expert
witness .8  This conclusion is very sympathetic towards medical
malpractice plaintiffs, and in cases like Brisson, where the plaintiff
inadvertently failed to include the certification, this is a desirable
outcome. The course taken in Brisson to cure this sort of clerical
error, however, will have several significant ramifications for future
medical malpractice litigation in North Carolina.
First, Brisson has seriously curtailed the Rule 90) certification as
a prerequisite to filing a medical malpractice action. Although the
requirement continues to exist, the substance of Rule 9(j) is impaired
because a plaintiff can circumvent the requirement by taking a
voluntary dismissal. This result permits a "file first, then dismiss, then
review" scenario that is at odds with Rule 9(j)'s purpose of preventing
frivolous medical malpractice suits by mandating expert review as a
prerequisite to filing. 2 Unfortunately, Brisson may allow, if not
78. Arguably, this interpretation contradicts the court's statement that Rule 41(a)(1)
is available to avoid dismissal for "rule violations" and "evidentiary failures." Id. A
plaintiff can still a take a pre-emptive voluntary dismissal, however, if she fears dismissal
for a rule violation or anticipates exclusion of evidence. See Schnitzlein v. Hardee's Food
Sys., 134 N.C. App. 153, 157-58, 516 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1999) (holding that a voluntary
dismissal as a matter of right was available because the motion to dismiss did not address
the merits of plaintiff's case); HOWELL, supra note 22, at § 41-2 (explaining that
participation in a motion to dismiss hearing for failure to comply with a discovery order
does not preclude a plaintiff from taking a voluntary dismissal as a matter of right when
the court does not address the merits of the case (citing Lowe v. Bryant, 55 N.C. App. 608,
613, 286 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1982))). Thus, this rule would simply bar plaintiffs from judge
shopping, and thereby abusing Rule 41(a)(1) to extend the statute of limitations after an
adverse ruling.
79. Brisson, 351 N.C. at 597-98,528 S.E.2d at 573.
80. Id.
81. ML
82. See Keith v. N. Hosp. Dist., 129 N.C. App. 402,405-06,499 S.E.2d 200,202 (1998)
(rejecting the "file first, review later" argument as inconsistent with the purpose of Rule
90)).
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encourage, crafty lawyers to engage in this type of conduct. Although
the one-year extension is limited to complaints filed in good faith, bad
faith filing will often be difficult to establishPs Arguably, if a plaintiff
re-files the claim within a short period (e.g., within a few weeks), this
timing would suggest that the complaint was filed in good faith and
that the omission of the expert certification was merely an oversight.
This certainly could be considered when bad faith is at issue. This
critique, however, seems quite unfair considering that Rule 41(a)
expressly grants plaintiffs the right to take a whole year to re-filer
4
Moreover, a lawyer acting in good faith who had valid reasons for not
re-filing immediately might be penalized for doing what she is wholly
entitled to do-take up to a year to re-file the lawsuit.
Second, Brisson may also lead to the questionable practice of
getting unqualified experts to review the treatment in order to meet
the statute of limitations, and then dismissing the action with an extra
year to comply. 5 Under Brisson, a plaintiff who cannot find someone
reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness could arguably
get an unqualified witness to review the treatment, and then
voluntarily dismiss the claim with an extra year to find a qualified
expert. A quick comparison of two different cases indicates that this
possibility has already been realized.
In Robinson v. Entwinstle,8 6 decided before Brisson, a medical
malpractice plaintiff filed his complaint without including the Rule
9(j) certification.87 Before the defendants filed responsive pleadings,
83. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. After the Brisson decision was
announced, Kari R. Johnson, a Raleigh lawyer who wrote an amicus brief on behalf of the
North Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys, expressed similar concerns: "It's clear
that the plaintiff had lined up a 9(j) expert when the first complaint was filed, but the
Supreme Court opinion can be read to allow people who don't have 90) expert[s] to file,
then dismiss in order to give them time to line up an expert." Michael Dayton, Plaintiff
Could Take Dismissal To Fix Rule 9q) Defect, N.C. LAW. WEEKLY, May 15, 2000, at A3
(quoting Kari R. Johnson).
84. N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).
85. At the same time Rule 9() was enacted, the legislature heightened the
requirements for expert witness qualifications in medical malpractice lawsuits. See N.C. R.
EviD. 702 (Expert Qualifications). Therefore, while Rule 9(j) made it harder to file a
malpractice action by requiring expert review, Rule 702 also reduced the number of
people who qualified as experts in medical malpractice actions. Given the reduced
number of experts available to meet the Rule 9(j) requirements, attorneys who do not
specialize in medical malpractice litigation-i.e., those who will not have a list of qualified
experts that are usually consulted-may be enticed to get unqualified experts and then
locate someone who qualifies at a later date.
86. 132 N.C. App 519, 512 S.E.2d 438, discretionary review denied, 350 N.C. 595, 537
S.E.2d 482 (1999).
87. Id. at 520,512 S.E.2d at 439.
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the plaintiff amended his complaint to include the proper
certification. The named expert, however, did not qualify under Rule
702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.88 The plaintiff then
took a voluntary dismissal without prejudice and re-filed the lawsuit
within one year.89  The North Carolina Court of Appeals, citing
Estrada, held that the Rule 41(a)(1) "savings" provision could not
extend the statute of limitations because the treatment had not been
subject to review by a qualified expert prior to the expiration of the
statute of limitationsf0
Conversely, in Allen v. Carolina Permanente Medical Group,91
decided less than three months after Brisson, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals suggested that the Rule 41(a)(1) one-year extension
might be available when a plaintiff's Rule 90) expert is not
"reasonably expected" to qualify under Rule 702.91 In Allen, the
plaintiff's complaint included the Rule 90) certification. The court of
appeals, however, affirmed the trial court's involuntary dismissal with
prejudice because the plaintiff could not have "reasonably expected
[the expert] to qualify" under Rule 702.91 In response to the
plaintiff's argument that the trial court should have dismissed the case
without prejudice, the court of appeals, citing Brisson, implied that
had the plaintiff in Allen taken a voluntary dismissal before the court
involuntarily dismissed with prejudice, the one-year extension to re-
file the claim would have been available.94 Presumably, Brisson's
good faith requirement extends to finding experts that are reasonably
expected to satisfy Rule 9(j); however, proving bad faith under these
circumstances would be more difficult than establishing bad faith
where the complaint is wholly lacking in expert review.95
Third, as the dissent pointed out, Brisson extended the statute of
limitations for filing a medical malpractice action.96 By obtaining a
120-day extension, a plaintiff has as long as three years and four
88. Id. at 520-21, 512 S.E.2d at 439-40.
89. Id.
90. 1I at 522-23, 512 S.E.2d at 441.
91. No. COA99-1038, 2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 903, 533 S.E.2d 812 (N.C. App. Aug. 1,
2000).
92. See id. at *9, 533 S.E.2d at 815.
93. Id
94. See i&t at *16-17,533 S.E.2d at 817.
95. The Brisson defense lawyer, Barry S. Cobb, had similar concerns that the Brisson
majority opinion will allow plaintiffs to circumvent Rule 90) by getting unqualified experts
to review the case and then voluntarily dismissing the case in order to get a qualified
expert. Dayton, supra note 83, at 3.
96. Brisson, 351 N.C. at 600,528 S.E.2d at 574 (Wainwright, J., dissenting).
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months to file a valid complaint.97 If that is not enough time, the
plaintiff may file the complaint anyway and, to avoid the appearance
of filing in bad faith, wait until the defense makes a motion to dismiss
(which could take up to a month98), and then take a Rule 41(a)(1)
voluntary dismissal. 99 This conduct is deplorable, but unscrupulous
lawyers will nonetheless attempt it. Incidentally, this result also
creates a safety net for incompetent or results-driven lawyers who
cannot (or do not attempt to) get a 120-day extension."°
Finally, Brisson reduces the judicial control that trial judges will
have in managing their courts. If a trial judge cannot deny a 120-day
extension without knowing whether her order will be respected,0 1 the
court has lost its power to regulate a claim that it obviously perceived
unworthy of an extension. In addition, suppose the re-filed claim
ends up in front of the same judge who initially denied the extension.
Whether or not trial judges will be extra-critical of these lawyers the
second time around is not known; but if so, it will be at the expense of
the client who may not have done anything wrong.
While the court's attempt to harmonize Rules 41 and 9(j) to
protect a meritorious claim is commendable, there is an alternative
course that can achieve the same result without creating some of
these problems. Notwithstanding that Rule 90) provides an
opportunity to extend the statute of limitations by 120 days, there is
nothing in Rule 9(j) that requires a judge to dismiss the claim "with"
prejudice. 1°2 Drawing upon a trial judge's authority to dismiss
without prejudice is a much more efficient way to handle Rule 9(j)
defects when the plaintiff merely fails to attach the required
97. See N.C. R. CIV. P. 90). The statute of limitations for filing a medical malpractice
action in North Carolina is three years. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (1999).
98. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 12 (1999).
99. Again, the plaintiff is subject to the good faith requirement. But see Hawkins v.
State, 117 N.C. App. 615, 623-24, 453 S.E.2d 233, 238 (1995) (holding that there was
neither evidence the plaintiff filed the first complaint solely to toll the statute of
limitations when he waited over two months to dismiss the complaint, nor was there a
judicial admission that the plaintiff filed and dismissed the original complaint in bad faith).
100. Arguably, a plaintiff would be better off not even trying to get a 120-day extension
so that it does not appear as if he is filing (or dismissing) in bad faith.
101. Recall that a plaintiff can escape the good cause requirement of Rule 9(j) by filing
the complaint, and then dismissing it without prejudice to gain an extra year. See supra
notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
102. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 90); see also Keith v. N. Hosp. Dist., 129 N.C. App. 402, 405
n.3, 499 S.E.2d 200, 202 n.3 (1998) (noting that the Rule 9(j) mandatory dismissal does not
preclude a trial judge from using his discretion to dismiss without prejudice). This
discretion to dismiss without prejudice was also re-affirmed by the court of appeals after
the Brisson decision. See Allen v. Carolina Permanente Med. Group, No. COA99-1038,
2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 903, at *16,533 S.E.2d 812,817 (N.C. App. Aug. 1, 2000).
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certification. The trial judge is often in the best position to determine
whether the plaintiff made a clerical error by failing to attach the 90)
certification (in which case a dismissal without prejudice is within the
judge's discretion), or whether the plaintiff is filing in bad faith
without having prior expert review (in which case a dismissal with
prejudice is warranted). 10 3 Furthermore, there will rarely be a
sufficient record for a later court to distinguish good faith from bad
faith.104 By allowing judges to determine whether a particular 90)
defect warrants dismissal with or without prejudice, the legislature's
goal of preventing frivolous claims is accomplished and the
threatened abuse of Rule 41(a)(1) is prevented. Under this regime
both sides are better off; defendants are protected from unethical
behavior and plaintiffs can save their voluntary dismissal without
prejudice for a rainy day.
In today's litigious society, it is imperative to have a mechanism
for curbing frivolous lawsuits. Rule 9(j) was the General Assembly's
attempt to do so in the area of medical malpractice,"°5 but Brisson has
taken the reform effort a step back. The General Assembly needs to
clarify how plaintiffs can remedy inadvertent defects like the one in
Brisson. One approach could be to revise Rule 9(j) to include a
provision that allows plaintiffs to amend the complaint to comply with
the Rule, perhaps subject to a "good cause" showing that the proper
expert review was made prior to the expiration of the statute of
limitations. This would ensure that meritorious claims are not
summarily dismissed for merely failing to attach the requisite
certification in the complaint. The legislature also needs to clarify
when the Rule 41(a)(1) extension should be available. Neither
Estrada nor Brisson cited authority for their opposing applications of
Rule 41. Therefore, a directive from the General Assembly would
eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the use of a Rule 41(a)(1)
103. Note that in Estrada the court determined that the complaint was filed in bad faith
only after the plaintiff's attorney admitted, in oral argument, that the sole reason he filed
the action was to toll the statute of limitations. See Estrada v. Burnham, 316 N.C. 318,
324-25, 341 S.E.2d 538, 542-43 (1986). In light of Estrada, an attorney predisposed to
abuse Rule 41(a)(1) is not likely to thereafter admit his bad faith and be tossed out of
c6urt (and sanctioned). Even if the court could later investigate whether the plaintiff had
obtained expert review prior to the original statute of limitations, it is much more efficient
to make such an inquiry when the plaintiff files the complaint the first time. If he merely
failed to attach the certification, then he will be able to produce the proper certification in
a matter of minutes. If he cannot produce the certification, it is appropriate to assume that
actual expert review is lacking.
104. See supra note 103.
105. See Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 309, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 611 (codified at N.C. R.
Civ. P. 90)).
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extension in cases where the complaint does not conform in all
respects to the rules of pleading and where a plaintiff has received an
adverse ruling prior to resting his case.
JOHN HusKE ANDERSON, JR.
